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The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has been involved in many
important decisions in the securities law area and the 1975-1976 term was no
exception. During the term two Seventh Circuit securities cases were decided
by the United States Supreme Court and two others were directly affected by
Supreme Court decisions. This article will describe what the authors believe
are the most significant developments in the area of securities law which
occurred in the Seventh Circuit during the last term. The major topics to be
covered include scienter and materiality in cases involving the anti-fraud
sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, particularly sections 10(b)
and 14(e), liability under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act, the so-called short
swing profits section, the definition of the terms "security" and "sale" under
both the 1934 Act and the Securities Act of 1933 and the application of the
statute of limitations in securities cases.
SECTION 10(b) AND RULE lOb-5: SCIENTER
The Supreme Court's decision in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder,1 revers-
ing a 1974 opinion of the Seventh Circuit, 2 was perhaps the Court's most
significant decision in the securities field during the last term. In a six to two
opinion by Justice Powell, the Court held that a private cause of action for
damages under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19343 and rule
lOb-5 thereunder, 4 could not be maintained in the absence of an allegation of
I"scienter," defined by the Court to mean "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate or defraud."
5
The case involved a claim by plaintiffs that the president of a Chicago
brokerage house (which was a member of the Midwest Stock Exchange)
* Partner, Gardner, Carton & Douglas; former chairman, Securities and Exchange
Commission, August, 1973 to October, 1975. LL.B., Harvard University.
** Associate, Gardner, Carton & Douglas; J.D., University of Chicago.
1. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
2. 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974). See discussion of the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
Fishman, Securities Law, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 549, 556-59 (1974).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1934 Act].
4. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976).
5. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
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induced them to invest in "escrow accounts," which were to bear a high rate
of interest. After the president's suicide it was discovered that the firm was
insolvent and the "escrow accounts" were spurious, the president having
converted the funds invested therein to his own use. In an earlier opinion the
Seventh Circuit found that the president's activities violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5 and that the firm was also liable as an aider and abettor. 6 Unable to
recover their losses from the insolvent firm and having failed in an action
against the Midwest Stock Exchange,' the escrow account investors filed suit
against Ernst & Ernst, charging them with negligently auditing the books of
the brokerage firm. Plaintiffs argued that if Ernst & Ernst had conducted a
proper audit the fraudulent nature of the escrow accounts would have been
discovered.8
In determining whether a violation of section 10(b) had occurred, the
Seventh Circuit adopted a "flexible standard of liability" 9 which could be
molded to fit the peculiarities of every section 10(b) case:
a claim for aiding and abetting is made on demonstrating: (1) that
the defendant had a duty of inquiry; (2) the plaintiff was a ben-
eficiary of that duty of inquiry; (3) the defendant breached the duty
of inquiry; (4) concomitant with the breach of duty of inquiry the
defendant breached a duty of disclosure; and (5) there is a causal
connection between the breach of duty of inquiry and disclosure
and the facilitation of the underlying fraud; that is, adequate inquiry
and subsequent disclosure would have led to the discovery of the
underlying fraud or its prevention.10
Judge Swygert, writing for the majority, found that Ernst & Ernst had a
statutory duty under section 17(a) of the 1934 Act" and rule 17a-5 there-
under12 to conduct its audit in accordance with "generally accepted auditing
standards" and that if Ernst & Ernst had breached its duty by conducting a
negligent audit, it could be held liable as an aider and abettor under section
10(b) and rule 1Ob-5 even though it did not participate in or have knowledge
of the principal party's fraudulent conduct.13
The Supreme Court reversed. It rejected the notion that liability could
attach under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 in the absence of proof of scienter.
The Court thought that the use, in section 10(b), of the words "manipulative
or deceptive" in conjunction with "device or contrivance" "strongly
6. SEC v. First Sec. Co., 463 F.2d 981, 986, 988 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972).
7. Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875
(1974).
8. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974).
9. Id.
10. Id.
ii. 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1970).
12. 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-5 (1976).
13. 503 F.2d at 1108.
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suggest[s] that section 10(b) was intended to proscribe knowing or intentional
misconduct." 14 The Court found support for this conclusion in the scant
legislative history of section 10(b) and in a comparison of other sections of the
securities acts where Congress clearly specified the standard for liability. 15
By focusing on an analysis of the language of the section and rule, the
Court rejected the approach advocated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission and adopted by Justice Blackmun in his dissent which would
look to the effect of a defendant's activities on the investor. Since, under that
approach, an investor may be injured by a defendant's negligent conduct as
well as by his intentional conduct, section 10(b) should be read to proscribe
both types of conduct. 16 However, the majority felt that such an interpretation
of 10(b) was precluded by Congress' choice of the language of section 10(b).
The Court's opinion left three issues undecided. First, the Court did not
reach the issue of whether civil liability could be imposed under section 10(b)
for aiding and abetting, even with scienter, nor did it discuss the elements
necessary to establish such a cause of action. 17 Second, the Court left open the
question of whether "scienter" would be a necessary element in injunctive
actions under section 10(b), 18 a requirement imposed in two recent district
court cases where injunctive or other equitable relief was sought. 19 Finally,
the Court left open the issue of whether some degree of reckless behavior
would suffice as "scienter" under its holding.2'
This last open question has already been involved in several cases,21
including two in the Seventh Circuit. The first is Sanders v. Nuveen & Co.22
The issue in Sanders was whether a securities dealer who relied on an issuer's
14. 425 U.S. at 197.
15. Id. at 201-11.
16. The SEC went on to argue that "ordinary negligence," such as appeared to exist in this
case, was not enough to sustain the granting of money damages as distinct from injunctive relief
which might be sought in an action brought by the SEC. Brief for SEC as Amicus Curiae at 23-36,
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
17. 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7.
18. Id. at 193-94 n.12.
19. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (scienter must be
pleaded and proved in a SEC action for injunctive relief); Vacca v. Intra Management Corp., 415
F. Supp. 248 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (proof of scienter required in private action for equitable remedy of
rescission).
20. 425 U.S. at 193-94 n.12.
21. McLean v. Alexander, 420 F. Supp. 1057 (D. Del. 1976) (accountant held liable under
rule lOb-5 in absence of actual intent to defraud upon proof of actual knowledge of material facts
not revealed and reckless misrepresentations); Carroll v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (mere conclusory allegations of fraud insufficient where gist of plaintiff's cause
of action is negligent management of portfolio by broker); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v.
Goldman, Sachs & Co., 420 F. Supp. 231 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (no liability in absence of proof of
scienter); Raskas v. Supreme Equip. & Sys. Corp., [1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,694 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (allegation that defendants "knew or should have known" about
misrepresentations is sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss since knowledge is alleged).
22. 524 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1975), vacated, 96 S. Ct. 1659 (1976).
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certified financial statements in distributing the issuer's commercial paper
could be held liable under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 to purchasers of the
paper when it was discovered that the financial statements were materially
misleading in overstating the financial health of the issuer. The plaintiffs
contended that Nuveen failed to conduct an adequate investigation which
would have uncovered the fraudulent nature of the financial statements. There
was no allegation that Nuveen had any knowledge of or otherwise participated
in the fraud.
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge (now Justice) Stevens,
specifically avoided a discussion of the appropriate standard of culpability in
a section 10(b) case and appeared to adopt the "flexible standard" used by the
Seventh Circuit in its opinion in Hochfelder.
23
Judge Stevens held that Nuveen's conduct did violate section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5. The significant factor in the Court's opinion was Nuveen's status
as an "underwriter." Even though the distribution was exempt from registra-
tion under the Securities Act of 193324 and Nuveen was not, therefore, subject
to the provisions of section 11 of the 1933 Act,25 the status of Nuveen as an
"underwriter" had other consequences. First, as an underwriter, Nuveen had
access to facts about the issuer not readily available to the public. Second, the
relationship between an underwriter and its customer implies a recommenda-
tion of the security and a representation that the underwriter has made an
investigation of the issuer which satisfies the standards of his profession.
26
The court felt that an underwriter could not ignore "the possibility of fraud",
even in the case of an issuer with an impeccable reputation. Accordingly,
Nuveen was under a "duty to make at least some investigation directed at the
question of whether the ever present possibility of fraud is in fact a reality.' 27
Having failed to make this investigation, Nuveen violated section 10(b) and
rule lOb-5.
Nuveen filed its petition for certiorari on January 28, 1976. After its
decision in Hochfelder, the Supreme Court vacated the decision in Sanders
and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit. 28 On remand, the Seventh
23. Id. at 1069. The court stated:
[W]e deliberately avoid any extended discussion of the broad question whether there is
a generally applicable standard of culpability in Rule 10b-5 cases lying somewhere
between the extremes of common law fraud on the one hand and mere negligence on
the other. We assume the standard may be phrased differently in different circum-
stances. (footnotes omitted).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3) (1970) [hereinafter referred to in the text as the 1933 Act].
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1970). Although the trial of the case did not involve the registration
issue, it has been raised by the Securities and Exchange Commission in an amicus brief filed with
the Seventh Circuit on the remand of the case from the Supreme Court. Brief for SEC as Amicus
Curiae at 48-51, Sanders v. Nuveen & Co., Nos. 74-2047, 75-1260 (7th Cir. filed Oct. 21, 1976).
26. 524 F.2d at 1070.
27. Id. at 1071.
28. 96 S. Ct. 1659 (1976).
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Circuit will undoubtedly consider the question left open by Hochfelder: Is
there some degree of reckless behavior which will satisfy the "scienter"
requirement? A glimpse into how the Seventh Circuit may approach this issue
is afforded by another post-Hochfelder decision, Bailey v. Meister Brau,
Inc.
29
Plaintiff in Bailey was the president, treasurer and director of the James
H. Black Company. James H. Black, Sr. owned 57,000 of the company's
70,000 shares, a director's wife owned 10,000 and plaintiff Bailey owned
3,000. By contract Bailey had a right of first refusal to purchase Mr. Black's
shares from him or, after his-death, from his estate. Upon Mr. Black's death,
defendant Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago
became the owner of the shares as executor under Black's will. Defendant
Meister Brau, Inc. made an offer to the Continental to purchase Black's
shares. When advised of this, Bailey informed Continental he would exercise
his right of first refusal within the sixty-day period provided in the contract.
But, before that period expired, Continental accepted Meister Brau's offer
and sold the shares to Meister Brau, receiving as part of the consideration an
indemnification agreement from Meister Brau. Meister Brau also purchased
the 10,000 shares from the director's wife. As part of the transaction all of the
assets of James H. Black Company were transferred to a new company, Black
Products Company of Delaware, Inc. and in return James H. Black Company
received 70,000 shares of unregistered Meister Brau shares worth about half
of the value of the assets transferred. Bailey was removed as president and
treasurer, had his salary cut to the minimum allowed by his employment
contract and was not reelected to the board. Bailey then brought a stockholder
derivative suit as minority stockholder of James H. Black Company alleging
that defendants Continental and Meister Brau, among others, violated section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. The complaint also alleged a section 10(b) claim on
behalf of Bailey individually and a tort claim for intentional interference with
Bailey's contractual right of first refusal. The district court upheld Bailey's
claim on the tort count and the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court
also held that defendant Continental violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 and
awarded attorney's fees based on that finding.
30
Since the finding of liability under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 was the
legal predicate for the assessment of attorney's fees, the Seventh Circuit had
to review this holding before it could discuss the fee question. The gist of
Bailey's claims under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 was that Continental, a
controlling shareholder of James H. Black Company, committed a fraud upon
the minority shareholder by allowing Meister Brau to receive all of the
29. 535 F.2d 982 (7th Cir. 1976).
30. Id. at 984 (citing district court opinions).
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company's assets in exchange for unregistered Meister Brau stock worth
much less than the assets transferred. There was no direct evidence that
Continental knew that the unregistered Meister Brau stock was worth substan-
tially less than the Black Company assets. The court quoted from the district
court's findings that Continental was: " 'grossly negligent in failing to
recognize the unfairness of the asset transfer' and 'blinded by a conflict of
interest, [Continental] wantonly ignore[d] evidence of the unfairness of [the]
securities transaction... .' "31
On this record of "gross negligence" the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
finding of violations of section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. In a footnote to its
opinion the court stated that its holding is not contrary to the Supreme Court's
opinion in Hochfelder.32 It would have been more helpful if the Seventh
Circuit had confronted the issue of what degree of reckless behavior would
satisfy the Supreme Court's requirement of scienter in the body of its opinion
rather than in a footnote. The casual treatment of this rather important issue by
a visiting judge sitting by designation makes it difficult to gauge with
certainty the Seventh Circuit's attitude on this issue. However, the affirmance
of the finding of liability in Bailey indicates that the Seventh Circuit, in an
appropriate case, will find that reckless conduct can lead to a violation of
section 10(b) in the absence of knowledge or intent to defraud.
SECTION 14(a): MATERIALITY
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc.33 also involved the reversal of a
Seventh Circuit decision by the Supreme Court. In Northway the Court was
faced with a conflict among the courts of appeals with regard to the definition
of the term "materiality" as used in rule 14a-934 of the proxy rules. The
genesis of the split of authority was an earlier Supreme Court case which also
originated in the Seventh Circuit, Mills v. Electric Auto Lite Co.35 In Mills
the issue was the causal relationship between an allegedly false and mislead-
ing proxy statement and the approval of a merger which had to be shown in
order to establish a violation of rule 14a-9.6 Accepting the Seventh Circuit's
finding that the omission was "material," the Court in Mills held:
31. Id. at 993 (citing Sanders v. Nuveen & Co., 524 F.2d 1064, 1069 (7th Cir. 1975)).
32. 535 F.2d at 994 n.14.
33. 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976), rev'g 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
34. 17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 (1976). The rule, promulgated under section 14(a) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970), provides in pertinent part as follows:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any material fact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
35. 3% U.S. 375 (1970).
36. Id. at 377.
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Where there has been a finding of materiality, a shareholder has
made a sufficient showing of causal relationship between the
violation and the injury for which he seeks redress if, as here, he
proves that the proxy solicitation itself, rather than the particular
defect in the solicitation materials was an essential link in the
accomplishment of the transaction.
In reaching this conclusion Justice Harlan commented upon the Seventh
Circuit's finding that the omission was "material" as follows:
Where the misstatement or omission in a proxy statement has
been shown to be "material," as it was found to be here, that
determination itself indubitably embodies a conclusion that the
defect was of such a character that it might have been considered
important by a reasonable shareholder who was in the process of
deciding how to vote. This requirement that the defect have a
significant propensity to affect the voting process is found in the
express terms of Rule 14a-9, and it adequately serves the purpose of
ensuring that a cause of action cannot be established by proof of a
defect so trivial, or so unrelated to the transaction for which
approval is sought, that correction of the defect or imposition of
liability would not further the interests protected by § 14(a).38
Thus, in Mills, the Court decided that a more liberal view of the element of
causation was justified in cases where the untrue or omitted fact was found to
be "material.' 39 However, by accepting the Seventh Circuit's determination
that the particular omission involved in Mills was material, the Court was not
called upon to delineate the proper standard of materiality.
This question was presented in three post-Mills decisions in the courts of
appeals. In Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc. ,4 Judge Friendly of the Second
Circuit considered Justice Harlan's comments in Mills in light of the purposes
of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act and the rules promulgated thereunder. He
concluded that the proper definition of materiality was contained in the
second sentence of Harlan's comments that the defect in the proxy materials
must have a "significant propensity" to affect the voting process. 41 The next
year the Fifth Circuit adopted the same test of materiality in Smallwood v.
Pearl Brewing Co.
42
One year later the Seventh Circuit had the opportunity to define the
standard of materiality in a proxy solicitation case. Focusing on the same two
37. Id. at 385.
38. Id. at 384 (footnote omitted).
39. The Supreme Court took a similar position in cases under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule l0b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1976), in Affiliated Ute Citizens
v. United States, 406 U.S. 127 (1972), it held that proof of reliance would not be required in
cases where an omitted fact was found to be material. The issue of the definition of the concept
of "materiality" was not presented in Affiliated Ute. See TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, 96 S.
Ct. 2126, 2132 n.9 (1976).
40. 478 F.2d 1281 (2d Cir. 1973).
41. 478 F.2d at 1302.
42. 489 F.2d 579, 603-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974).
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sentences in Mills as had the Second and Fifth Circuits, the Seventh Circuit
selected a more expansive approach to materiality. Judge Swygert, writing
for the court in Northway, Inc. v. TSC Industries, Inc. ,43 described the two
tests which he found suggested by Justice Harlan:
[T]he "might have" test would ask whether a reasonable mind
could conclude that the omitted fact is so irrelevant that it would
never reasonably be considered important. The "significant pro-
pensity" test would ask whether a reasonable mind could conclude
that the fact is less than significant in its potential to affect the
voting process. Many facts which are relevant within the first test
could reasonably be said to have less than a significant propensity
to affect the voting process taken as a whole, even though for some
few stockholders these same facts could be determinative."
The Seventh Circuit selected the "might have" test as the one which better
served the policies underlying section 14(a). The court feared that the more
restrictive "significant propensity" test would undercut the prophylactic
effect of the proxy disclosure provisions. Responding to Judge Friendly's fear
that the "might have" test was too low a threshhold for materiality, Judge
Swygert responded that the element of the "reasonable mind" would protect
corporations from liability for minor omissions. The court proceeded to use
the "might have" test to analyze the alleged omissions. It concluded that four
of the five omissions were of material facts and that as to those plaintiff was
entitled to summary judgment.
The Supreme Court, without dissent, reversed. 45 The Court agreed with
the Seventh Circuit as to the broad remedial purposes of section 14(a) and the
desire to supply shareholders with information and explanation as to the
matters upon which they are asked to vote. But, echoing a sentiment recently
found in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,46 the Court stressed that
there are limits to the disclosure policy. The Court feared that corporations,
faced with a "might have" test, would "bury the shareholder in an avalanche
of trivial information ' 47 to avoid potential liability, thereby confusing
shareholders rather than assisting them. To avoid this danger, the Court held
that the better standard of materiality would be:
[A]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote . . . . [This standard] does not require proof of a
substantial likelihood that disclosure of the omitted fact would have
caused the reasonable investor to change his vote. What the stand-
ard does contemplate is a showing of a substantial likelihood that,
under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed
43. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 96 S. Ct. 2126 (1976).
44. Id. at 330.
45. The decision was 8-0. Justice Stevens did not participate in the decision.
46. 421 U.S. 723, 739-44 (1975).
47. 96 S. Ct. at 2132-33.
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actual significance in the deliberations of the reasonable share-
holder. Put another way, there must be a substantial likelihood that
the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by the
reasonable investor as having significantly altered the "total mix"
of information made available.48
The difference between the definitions of "materiality" adopted by the
Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit is more than just "gossamer" as was
suggested by Judge Friendly in Gerstle.4 9 The Supreme Court found that each
of the four omissions which was material as a matter of law under the Seventh
Circuit's test, was not material as a matter of law under its test. The definition
adopted by the Supreme Court appears to strike a better balance between
investor protection and disclosure and the burdens placed on corporations in
complying with disclosure provisions. If corporations had to include in
disclosure documents all information which "might" influence an investor,
even if only a reasonable investor, the documents would become more
unmanageable and complex than they already are and neither investors nor
corporations would benefit. Also, since liability under several anti-fraud
provisions of the securities acts also involves consideration of the material-
ity of the misrepresented or omitted fact,5" the Supreme Court decision in
Northway is consistent with the recent trend of the Court to more narrowly
construe these provisions.
51
SECTION 16(b): LIABILITY AND MEASURE OF DAMAGES
In Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. Gulf & Western Industries,
Inc.52 the Seventh Circuit was confronted with three interesting issues under
section 16(b) of the 1934 Act,5 3 two concerning liability and one concerning
48. Id. at 2133.
49. 478 F.2d at 1302.
50. See, e.g., sections 10(b) and 14(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78m(e) (1970).
51. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975) (private action
under section 10(b) and rule lOb-5 confined to actual purchasers or sellers of securities), and
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (see discussion in text following note 15, supra).
52. 527 F.2d 335 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied as to liability, 423 U.S. 1078 (1976), cert. denied
as to damages, 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
53. Section 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1970), provides in pertinent part.
(b) For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have
been obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relation-
ship to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security)
within any period of less than six months. . . shall inure to and be recoverable by the
issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director, or
officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not
repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding six months ...
This subsection shall not be construed to cover any transaction where such
beneficial owner was not such both at the time of the purchase and sale, or the sale and
purchase, of the security involved, or any transaction or transactions which the
Commission by rules and regulations may exempt as not comprehended within the
purpose of this subsection.
As used in section 16(b), the term "beneficial owner" means any person who owns 10% or more
of any class of equity securities issued by a corporation. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1970).
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the measure of damages. The facts of the case were relatively simple. In July,
1968 Gulf & Western acquired, through a public tender offer, 3,000,000
shares of common stock of Allis-Chalmers, representing more than 10% of
the outstanding shares of the class. In August, Gulf & Western acquired an
additional 248,000 Allis-Chalmers shares from Oppenheimer Fund, Inc., a
mutual fund. In October, Gulf & Western reached an agreement to sell its
3,248,000 Allis-Chalmers shares to White Consolidated Industries and in
December the transaction was closed. In January, 1969 Allis-Chalmers filed
suit under section 16(b) to recover the profits received by Gulf & Western on
the sale to White.
After trial the district court found Gulf & Western liable under section
16(b) for all profits realized on the sale of the 3,248,000 shares. 54 In reaching
this conclusion the district court interpreted the requirement of section 16(b)
that a beneficial owner be such "at the time of the purchase" to mean
"simultaneous with the purchase." ' Thus, Gulf & Western's initial pur-
chase of more than 10% of the Allis-Chalmers shares exposed it to automatic
liability upon a sale of such shares at a profit within six months. The district
court's interpretation of section 16(b) was consistent with opinions in the
Second Circuit.56
The Seventh Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Swygert, reversed in part
and found Gulf & Western liable only for the profits realized on the purchase
and sale of 248,000 shares, not for the 3,000,000 shares, on the ground that
Gulf & Western was not a 10% owner at the time of its purchase of the
3,000,000 shares. The court also reversed as to the measure of damages.
Judge Swygert began his analysis with the first sentence of section 16(b).
That sentence clearly states that section 16(b) seeks to prevent officers,
directors or 10% owners from profiting by the use of information which they
received as a result of their status as officers, directors or 10% owners. So,
Judge Swygert reasoned, if one does not have the requisite relationship prior
to the initial transaction in a purchase/sale or sale/purchase sequence, then
such person could not have been motivated by information received "by
reason of his relationship [i.e., officer, director or 10% owner] to the issuer."
Accordingly, the court held that Gulf & Western did not violate section 16(b)
with regard to its purchase and sale of 3,000,000 Allis-Chalmers shares
within a six-month period because Gulf & Western was not an insider prior to
its purchase of the 3,000,000 shares.
Having reached this conclusion, it was not necessary for Judge Swygert
54. 372 F. Supp. 570 (N.D. I11. 1974).
55. 372 F. Supp. at 576.
56. Newmark v. RKO General-, Inc., 425 F.2d 348 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 854
(1970); Stella v. Graham-Paige Motors Corp., 104 F. Supp. 957, 960 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), aff'd in
part, remanded in part, 232 F.2d 299 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 831 (1956).
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to interpret the second sentence of section 16(b), the exemptive provision,
which requires a 10% owner to be such "both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase." If Gulf & Western was not a 10% beneficial
owner at the time of the 3,000,000 share purchase and therefore not liable, it
is irrelevant to consider whether Gulf & Western had to be a beneficial owner
at the time of sale. Nonetheless, Judge Swygert analyzed the exemptive
provision and found that as to each sequence, purchase/sale or sale/purchase,
a beneficial owner must be such only at the time of the initial portion of the
sequence. Under this interpretation of the exemptive provision of a 10%
owner's status at the time of the closing portion of a purchase/sale or
sale/purchase sequence is irrelevant.
Allis-Chalmers filed its petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court on
October 16, 1975. On January 13, 1976 the Supreme Court issued its opinion
in Foremost-McKesson, Inc. v. Provident Securities Co. 57 In that case
Provident Securities had sold two-thirds of its assets to Foremost-McKesson
in exchange for convertible debentures of Foremost-McKesson which were
immediately convertible into more than 10% of Foremost-McKesson's stock.
Within six months Provident sold a portion of the debentures to a group of
underwriters. Provident then sought a declaratory judgment that its purchase
and sale did not subject it to liability under section 16(b).
The Supreme Court held, as did the Seventh Circuit, that in a pur-
chase/sale transaction a 10% owner had to be such prior to the purchase under
scrutiny. However, the Supreme Court's analysis was different from Judge
Swygert's. The Supreme Court concentrated on the exemptive provision
which required a 10% owner to be such "both at the time of the purchase and
sale, or the sale and purchase." Reviewing the legislative history, the Court
found that the purpose of the exemptive provision was to preserve, for 10%
owners, the requirement that they be such prior to the purchase under
scrutiny. Unlike the Seventh Circuit, the Court did not go further in its
analsyis, expressly refusing to comment on the Seventh Circuit's conclusions
that (1) all insiders, directors and officers as well as beneficial owners, had to
acquire their insider status before the initial transaction in a subject se-
quence, 58 and (2) insider status at the time of the closing transaction in a
sequence was irrelevant. 59 However, since the result in Allis-Chalmers would
be the same under the Supreme Court's analysis, certiorari was denied.6 °
It is submitted that Judge Swygert's scholarly but gratuitous analysis of
the exemptive provision would not have been accepted by the Supreme Court.
57. 423 U.S. 232 (1976).
58. Id. at 243 n.16.
59. Id. at 250 n.25.
60. 423 U.S. 1078 (1976).
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In an earlier opinion in Reliance Electric Co. v. Emerson Electric Co.61 the
Supreme Court considered the case of a corporation which acquired 13.2% of
the stock of another corporation and then made two sales within six months,
one of 3.24% and one of the remaining 9.96%. The Court held that the
exemptive provision of 16(b) precluded liability as to the second sale because
the seller was not a 10% owner "at the time of. . . the sale." Although the
Court in Foremost-McKesson acknowledged that under its holding in that
case there would have been no liability for either sale in Emerson Electric,
62
the Court did not repudiate its holding in that case. Juxtaposition of the
Court's opinions in Emerson Electric and Foremost-McKesson results in an
interpretation of the exemptive provision which is inconsistent with Judge
Swygert's. In other words, the Supreme Court would seem to require a 10%
holder to be such prior to the opening and closing portions of a sequence,
whereas Judge Swygert would only require 10% ownership prior to the
opening transaction. As Judge Swygert noted, in every purchase/sale se-
quence, the requirement that a 10% owner be such prior to the time of the
purchase will always result in such person owning 10% prior to the time of the
subject sale. 63 Thus, in a purchase/sale sequence, the Court's opinions in
Emerson Electric and Foremost-McKesson are compatible with Judge
Swygert's opinion in Allis-Chalmers. The inconsistency would arise only in a
case of a sale/purchase sequence where the person owns less than 10% before
the purchase. Further, under Judge Swygert's analysis, all insiders, not just
10% holders, must have such status prior to the initial transaction in a subject
sequence, and status at the time of the closing transaction would be irrelevant.
This analysis renders the exemptive provision of section 16(b) which applies
only to 10% beneficial owners wholly superfluous.
A final consideration in predicting the Supreme Court's approach is that
Justice Stevens, when a member of the Seventh Circuit, was polled on
whether a rehearing en banc should have been granted in Allis-Chalmers. He
expressed his opinion that Judge Swygert's analysis is incorrect under both
the Supreme Court's decision in Emerson Electric and the language of the
exemptive provision. 64 The combination of these factors indicates that the
Supreme Court would not have accepted the analysis of the Seventh Circuit in
its entirety.
The second liability issue in Allis-Chalmers involved Gulf & Western's
second purchase of 248,000 Allis-Chalmers shares from a mutual fund. As
Gulf & Western already owned 3,000,000 shares at the time of the purchase,
61. 404 U.S. 418 (1972).
62. 423 U.S. at 250 n.25.
63. 527 F.2d at 348 n.12.
64. Id. at 341 n.5.
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it qualified as a 10% owner prior to the opening transaction in a purchase/sale
sequence. Thus, under the court's analysis, automatic liability would attach
under section 16(b) upon the profitable sale to White which took place within
six months.
Gulf & Western attempted to avoid automatic liability on the pur-
chase/sale of the 248,000 shares by invoking the Supreme Court decision in
Kern County Land Co. v. Occidental Petroleum Corp. 65 In Kern the Supreme
Court did not assess automatic liability as required under section 16(b).
Instead, the Court analyzed the transaction and concluded that there was no
possibility of short term speculative abuse of the type which 16(b) was
designed to prevent.
Gulf & Western argued that under the rule of Kern the court should
examine the transaction to see if there was the possibility of short term use of
inside inormation. The Seventh Circuit rejected this contention and held that
Gulf & Western was liable under section 16(b) for the profits from the
purchase and sale of the 248,000 shares. First, the court held that Kern did not
apply to the case before it. Under Kern before the question of the possibility
of the use of inside information becomes relevant, there must be present an
"unorthodox" purchase or sale, or, phrased otherwise, the threshhold
question is whether one or the other transaction should be regarded as a
purchase or sale for purposes of section 16(b). In Kern the 10% shareholder
gave up its holdings of the target company as a result of a defensive merger of
the target with a third corporation. This "sale" of the target's shares was
found not to be a voluntary act attributable to the party sought to be charged
with violating 16(b). In contrast, the Seventh Circuit found that neither Gulf
& Western's purchase, nor its sale of the 248,000 Allis-Chalmers shares, was
"unorthodox." Both were voluntary acts by Gulf & Western.
Even if it deemed either the purchase or the sale unorthodox, the court
found that it could not conclude that no opportunity for short term speculative
abuse existed. The court noted that after it acquired its 3,248,000 shares of
Allis-Chalmers, Gulf & Western received information from Allis-Chalmers'
chairman that the future prospects of the company were not very bright.
Subsequently, Gulf & Western arranged its sale to White. The court found
that the "possibility" existed that Gulf & Western actually did use inside
information as the basis of its decision to sell the Allis-Chalmers shares.
Based on this analysis, the court held that Gulf & Western was liable under
section 16(b) for the profit it made on its sale of 248,000 shares to White.
The final issue before the court was the calculation of Gulf & Western's
"profit." The most interesting aspect of the court's analysis of the appro-
priate measure of damages was its discussion of the six month, 8-1/2%
65. 411 U.S. 582 (1973).
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unsecured promissory note for $93,680,000 which Gulf & Western received
from White as partial consideration for the 3,248,000 Allis-Chalmers shares.
The district court discounted the note by 5% to account for the risk factors
involved in a note of that magnitude and to produce a value reflecting what a
disinterested third party would pay for the note. The district court rejected
evidence that the note was paid in full at maturity.
This, the Seventh Circuit found, was error. It held that "evidence of
payment in full, if available at the time of trial, should control the determi-
nation of 'profit realized.' "66 Since the note was paid in full by White, the
full value of the note should have been included in the calculation of the
consideration received by Gulf & Western. The court had no hesitation in
reaching this result "given the broad remedial purpose of section 16(b), its
limited impact, and the intent of Congress . . .to 'eradicate speculative
abuses by removing difficulties in proof.' "67
The court's holding in Allis-Chalmers that a subsequent event, payment
in full, should control the valuation of consideration for purposes of section
16(b) is not troublesome in the context of that case, i.e., a short term note
which could be considered the equivalent of cash. However, problems would
arise if the holding were expanded to cases involving longer term debt
securities and events other than payment in full. For example, what if Gulf &
Western had received long term marketable debt securities worth $93 million
at the closing but worth $123 million or $53 million at the time of trial? Does
the court advocate a reference to values at the time of trial in every case? A
shift of the valuation date of the consideration to the date of trial in every case
would create a situation where the "profits" realized in a 16(b) transaction
could be affected by factors having nothing to do with the policies behind
section 16(b).
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
In Parrent v. Midwest Rug Mills, Inc.61 the Seventh Circuit established
that the three-year statute of limitations found in the Illinois Blue Sky statute69
was applicable to suits brought under those anti-fraud provisions of the
federal securities acts where no statute of limitations is prescribed.7 ° In two
66. 527 F.2d at 357.
67. Id. Although Gulf & Western was able to limit its liability to the 248,000 share
transaction as opposed to the total 3,248,000 shares involved, the court's ruling on the measure of
damages more than offset Gulf & Western's victory. The trial court's ruling granted Allis-
Chalmers damages in the amount of $1,135,838.00 on the 3,248,000 share transaction whereas the
Seventh Circuit's ruling resulted in a damage awarded of $2,465,680.47 on the 248,000 share
transaction. Gulf & Western's petition for certiorari on the issue of the measure of damages was
denied. 424 U.S. 928 (1976).
68. 455 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1972).
69. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 137.13D (1975).
70. Parrent relied in part on the Eighth Circuit's decision in Vanderboom v. Sexton, 422
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cases decided within five days last term, the Seventh Circuit considered the
applicability of the equitable tolling doctrine to the three-year statute of
limitations.
The first case to be decided was Goldstant v. Bear, Stearns & Co.7
Plaintiffs in Goldstandt were partners in a broker-dealer firm which was
registered under the 1934 Act and a member of the National Association of
Securities Dealers72 but was not a member of a national securities exchange.
Defendant Bear, Stearns is a well-known securities firm and is a member of
the New York Stock Exchange. For years plaintiffs' brokerage house pro-
vided services for Bear, Stearns on the floor of the Chicago Mercantile
Exchange. In late 1967 defendant Turkish, a limited partner in Bear, Stearns,
suggested to plaintiffs that they could earn profits by becoming a customer of
Bear, Stearns and selling short certain securities which were the subject of
pending registration statements. On "several occasions" plaintiffs ques-
tioned the legality of such transactions but each time were told by Turkish that
he "had checked with the legal department of Bear, Stearns and that the
practice was 'proper.' 3 From 1968 through 1970 plaintiffs engaged in
thirty trades employing the practice suggested by Turkish.
In June, 1971, plaintiffs were served with a complaint by the NASD
alleging, inter alia, that the short sales were violations of the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice. 74 Goldstandt called Turkish who informed him that the practice
was illegal and that Turkish knew it was illegal all the time. Some time more
than three years after the last short sale, plaintiffs filed suit alleging that Bear,
Stearns and Turkish violated section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, section 17 of the
1933 Act, rule 405 of the rules of the New York Stock Exchange, section 1 of
article III of the NASD rules and that their acts constituted common law fraud.
The district court found that the suit was not filed within three years of the date
of the last sale involved and dismissed the federal law claims. The pendent
common law claim was then also dismissed.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Judge Swygert noted that two types of
F.2d 1233 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 852 (1970), which relied on the holding in Myzel v.
Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 951 (1968), that section 10(b) of the 1934
Act encompassed negligent as well as intentional misconduct. Query whether the statute of
limitations question is ripe for reexamination after the Supreme Court's opinion in Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Cf. Bailey v. Piper, Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc., 414 F. Supp.
475 (D. Minn. 1976) (the court held that an earlier Minnesota case adopting a six year common
fraud statute of limitation could not stand after Ernst & Ernst and that the three year limitation
period of the Minnesota Blue Sky law was more appropriate).
71. 522 F.2d 1265 (7th Cir. 1975).
72. Hereinafter referred to in the text as NASD.
73. 522 F.2d at 1266.
74. As to the status of such sales under the federal securities laws, see SEC Release Nos.
33-5323 & 34-9824, 1 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 4816 (1972), 17 C.F.R. § 231.5323 (1976);
Proposed Rule 10b-21, 2 FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 22,741 issued in SEC Release No. 34-11328,
[1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 80,147 (1975).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
fraudulent behavior could toll the running of the three-year statute: fraud
undiscovered by plaintiff's due diligence and fraud concealed by defendant's
conduct. Since plaintiffs did not allege concealment, Judge Swygert focused
only on plaintiffs' due diligence. Judge Swygert held that plaintiffs were not
diligent in that they did not obtain independent legal advice concerning the
short sale trades. Plaintiffs argued that until the NASD complaint was filed,
they had no reason to disbelieve Turkish or to obtain an independent legal
opinion. But, the court felt that given the general sophisication of the
plaintiffs and the ease with which they could have obtained a second opinion,
the policies of the statute of limitations would be better served by holding that
plaintiffs were obligated to "bestir themselves to inquire."
7 5
In the second case, Sperry v. Barggren,76 the court was faced with
enforcing the statute of limitations against an unsophisticated investor and the
result was different. Plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of Mr. Munn,
a retired employee of Badger Manufacturing Company of Marinette, Wiscon-
sin. Mr. Munn resided in Florida. Defendants were a 70% shareholder of
Badger and his son, a vice-president of Badger. The son visited Mr. Munn in
Florida and contracted with him to purchase Mr. Munn's 226 Badger shares at
$200 per share over a five-year period. A little more than two months later the
defendants agreed to sell their Badger shares to another corporation inerested
in acquiring Badger for $781 per share. The son assigned his contract with
Munn to the acquiring corporation and subsequently persuaded Munn to sell
all his shares in one transaction for a lump sum of $200 per share discounted to
present value. The son never informed Munn of the $781 per share price paid
by the acquiring corporation. A complaint alleging violations of section 10(b)
and rule 1 Ob-5 was filed in the Eastern District of Wisconsin more than three
years after the sale by Munn. 77 The district court held that Munn could have
discovered the fraud before the three-year peiod expired and granted sum-
mary judgment for defendants.
This time the Seventh Circuit reversed. Judge Tone held that the
presence or absence of concealment of the fraud was an issue of fact which
should be decided only by the trier of fact. Even if no active concealment were
found, it was an issue of fact whether the plaintiffs could have discovered the
fraud with the exercise of due care. In this regard the court noted that the
existence of a fiduciary relationship between the parties would lessen the
plaintiff's duty of inquiry. Furthermore, the mere fact that announcement of
the acquisition appeared in two Wisconsin papers and in Moody's Industrials
75. 522 F.2d at 1269.
76. 523 F.2d 708 (7th Cir. 1975).
77. In Kramer v. Loewi & Co., Inc., 357 F. Supp. 83 (E.D. Wis. 1973), it was held that the
three-year limitation period of Wisconsin's Blue Sky law applied to actions under section 10(b)
which arose before January 1, 1970. After that date the statute of limitations is one year.
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would not, as a matter of law, be considered sufficient to notify a Florida
resident, especially in view of the fact that none of the announcements
contained the $781 per share price.
The different attitude of the Seventh Circuit toward application of the
equitable tolling doctrine in these two cases seems clearly justified. In
Goldstandt, the plaintiffs were brokers and should have realized that their
short sales might depress the offering price of the securities under registra-
tion, thereby insuring that they could cover their short sales with lower priced
stock. This factor should have caused them to be somewhat skeptical of
Turkish's representations. Apparently, the court felt that plaintiffs' anticipa-
tion of profits affected their willingness to rely on Turkish's statements. In
contrast, plaintiff in Sperry appeared to be a passive victim of a plan to
deprive him of profits. The Seventh Circuit's application of the equitable
tolling doctrine in these two cases seems most equitable.
DEFINITION OF "SECURITY" AND "SALE"
Although the scope of this article does not include decisions by the
district courts, a recent case decided by Judge Kirkland of the Northern
District of Illinois has caused some alarm among persons involved in the
employee benefits field. In Daniel v. International Brotherhood of Team-
sters78 Judge Kirkland held that an employee's participation in an involun-
tary, noncontributory pension plan represented the sale of a security so that
allegations of misleading statements and omissions of material facts regard-
ing provisions of the plan were sufficient to state a cause of action under
section 10(b), rule lOb-5 and section 17(a) of the 1933 Act.79 Judge Kirkland
found that participation in a pension plan was an "investment contract" and
hence a "security" as defined in sections 2(1) of the 1933 Act 80 and 3(a)(10)
of the 1934 Act.8 1 Furthermore, participation in a pension plan satisfied all the
elements of a "security" required by the Supreme Court test in SEC v. W.J.
Howey Co.82 since a pension plan represented a common enterprise involving
an element of risk, entered into with the expectation of profit and where the
sole power of control is vested in the trustees.
The court further held that a "sale" of such security occurred by the
employee's giving of services, or alternatively by the contribution of a portion
78. 410 F. Supp. 541 (N.D. I11. 1976).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 17q(a) (1970).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (1970) provides in part as follows: "(1) The term 'security' means
any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of
interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement . ... "
81. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970) provides in part as follows: "(10) The term 'security'
means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in
any profit-sharing agreement .
82. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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of his wages, in exchange for the participation. This latter holding directly
contradicts a long-established position of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission that participation in mandatory, noncontributory pension plans does
not involve the "sale" of a security.
83
Judge Kirkland's interpretation could have far-reaching effects under the
securities laws. Involuntary, noncontributory pension plans would have to be
registered under the 1933 Act and prospectuses given to all job applicants who
could become eligibile to participate before they are hired. Additionally, it
would seem that prospectuses should be distributed to union members before
voting on collective bargaining agreements. Further, many disputes relating
to interpretation and application of the terms of a plan could be transformed
into fraud suits under the anti-fraud provisions of the 1933 and 1934 Acts. The
court did not mention these factors in its opinion and it is not known whether




Seventh Circuit decisions in securities cases during the past two terms,
especially those written by Judge Swygert, have tended to construe provisions
of the securities acts in a broad manner to protect the investing public. This
approach is evidenced by the court's opinions in Hochfelder, TSCIndustries,
Allis-Chalmers and Bailey. The court's expansive approach has collided with
the strict construction adopted by the Supreme Court in securities cases. The
result has been reversals of the Seventh Circuit in Hochielder and TSC
Industries. In those cases the Seventh Circuit would have created easier
standards for recovery in securities cases than the Supreme Court. Within the
parameters established by the Supreme Court, the Seventh Circuit seems
determined to continue to interpret the securities in a broad manner to fully
protect investors. The opinion in Bailey may be indicative in this regard.
The high quality legal analysis and writing which characterized all of the
Seventh Circuit decisions in this area was much appreciated by the authors.
Practitioners in this circuit can expect to find a highly qualified panel to hear
appeals in securities cases.
83. Opinions of Assistant General Counsel of Commission, [1941-1944 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 75,195; Senco Prods., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 80,775 (1976).
84. Daniel has been appealed to the Seventh Circuit, Daniel v. International Bhd. of
Teamsters, appeal docketed, No. 76-1855 (7th Cir. Sept. 1, 1976). The SEC has filed an amicus
brief with the Seventh Circuit supporting Judge Kirkland as to lOb-5 but not as to registration
requirements under the 1933 Act.
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